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background

inquiries addressed the same issue: tort reform. See R. 599-600. This was not some
arcane legal concept; this was an area in which the law has been "clear" for fifteen years.
Bee v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 2009 UT App 35, 204 P.3d 204. Nonetheless, the trial court
rejected all of the tort reform questions.
Mr. Christensen argues, however, that, "in their totality and in context," these two
questions were sufficient to "elicit substantially equivalent information" as the
information sought in Mr. Boyle's questions:
13.
Do you have any feelings or beliefs that would prevent you from
being fair and impartial regarding persons who have personal injury disputes and
who choose to resolve those disputes by going to court?
14. Do you have any personal religious or other beliefs that would
prevent you from awarding damages in a large amount, small amount, or zero
amount, if warranted and justified by the evidence and the law given you by the
Court?
(Brief of Appellee, p. 18, citing R. 536.)
It was this very type of generic questioning that the Court found insufficient in
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991), and its progeny. See Bee, supra; Alcazar,
supra; Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Such questions may filter
out jurors who are sufficiently self-aware and honest to answer them "No," but they do
not elicit impressions or viewpoints as needed for meaningful peremptory challenges.
The trial court's failure to touch on tort reform at all is a key distinction between
this case and Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cited by Mr. Christensen. In that case, the plaintiff appealed from a trial court's decision
with respect to voir dire. "[T]he gist of plaintiff s questions went to the issue of potential
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juror bias against large monetary awards." Id. at 447. Unlike this case, the trial court in
Ostler covered the subject requested by the plaintiff, just with differently worded
questions. Id.
Mr. Christensen says that the trial court asked "extensive questions of the jury
during oral voir dire in order to discover any potential bias or prejudice." (Brief of
Appellee, p. 19.) But these "follow-up questions" only followed up on the threshold
questions that the court asked, none of which encompassed tort reform.
Mr. Christensen also attempts to distinguish Alcazar by pointing out that that case
was a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff submitted voir dire that was specific
to medical malpractice claims. "Here," Mr. Christensen says, "the underlying case deals
with an auto/pedestrian accident, but the questions Plaintiff argues should have been
asked dealt with tort reform in general." (Brief of Appellee, p. 16.) Alcazar was indeed a
medical malpractice case. Bee was a slip and fall. In both cases, this Court said that tort
reform should be addressed.

As suggested by its name, in jurors' minds, the "tort

reform" movement extends to all "tort" cases. As such, the Court of Appeals' affirmance
of the trial court's failure to inquire regarding tort reform during voir dire should be
reversed.
B.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly found that Mr. Boyle failed to
preserve his request for tort reform voir dire.

Mr. Christensen does not contest the fact that Mr. Boyle timely submitted a
written request that jurors be questioned about their views on tort reform. See R. 596-600
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(plaintiffs requested questionnaire and voir dire). Nor does he deny that the trial court
did not announce its decision on that request before it conducted the voir dire.
Nonetheless, Mr. Christensen claims that Mr. Boyle was required to state his
request again "after receiving the court's written questions" - in other words, after the
trial court had already ruled on the requested voir dire.

(Brief of Appellee, p. 9)

(emphasis added). That is incorrect. With the exception of jury instructions, which are
governed by a separate rule (U.R.Civ.P. 51), the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide
that no exception need be taken of a ruling that has already occurred. U.R.Civ.P. 46
states:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient
that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes
known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to
the action of the court and his grounds therefore; and, if a party has no opportunity
to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection
does not thereafter prejudice him.
(Emphasis added.)
There is no dispute that, "at the time the ruling [was] sought," Mr. Boyle "ma[de]
known to the court the action which he desire[d] the court to take," i.e., to ask prospective
jurors about their views on tort reform. Rule 46 eliminates any requirement that an
attorney repeat a request that has already been denied by the court.
Mr. Christensen incorrectly implies that the trial court asked counsel if additional
questions were desired, and that Mr. Boyle's counsel could have reiterated his request for
tort reform questions at that time. His brief states:
When the jury pool was brought back before the judge [after a recess], he asked
many additional questions of juror number 8. (Id. at 93-97.) After his
4

questioning, the court invited counsel for both parties up for a bench conference
and specifically asked if they [had] any further questions, and both parties
indicated that they had nothing further. (Id. at 97:10-18.)
(Brief of Appellee, p. 10.)
The transcript reveals that the trial court's inquiry was actually limited to any
further questions of Juror No. 8 (who happened to be former insurance defense lawyer
Carmen Kipp's widow). After asking Mrs. Kipp about her husband's practice and her
own experience as a legal secretary (R. 693, pp. 92-97), a bench conference was held in
which the court asked only, "Did you have any other questions you want me to put to
her?" (Id, p. 97:15-16.)
It is obvious from that context that the trial court was asking whether counsel had
more questions for "her," i.e., Mrs. Kipp, not inviting exceptions to his overall voir dire.
In fact, unlike jury instructions, at no point during the voir dire process did the court ask,
or provide an opportunity, for exceptions. Upon the conclusion of its questioning of the
panel, the court proceeded immediately into the challenge phase of the selection. (R.
693, p. 90 (upon conclusion of panel questioning, court states, "[T]he record should
reflect, again, this is case number 050912506.

I have in chambers Mr. [Roger]

Christensen [counsel for Boyle] and Ms. Van Orman [counsel for Christensen]. And
we're at a point in the jury selection phase of the case where we have questioned 16 panel
members. And I understand that Ms. Van Orman wishes to challenge for cause one of
the first 16 panel members. Go ahead, Ms. Van Orman. . . ."))
Under U.R.Civ.P. 46, Mr. Boyle preserved his request for voir dire on the subject
of tort reform. However, even if some ambiguity existed on the issue, the trial court's
5

failure to conduct the requested voir dire would constitute plain error anyway, because
the error was "plain," and it was prejudicial. Davis v. Grand County, 905 P.2d 888, 892
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that its precedent on
this issue is "clear," and that the failure to ask tort reform questions is inherently
prejudicial. Bee, supra; Alcazar, supra; Barrett, supra; Evans, supra.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY HELD THAT
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S REFERENCE TO THE MCDONALD'S
COFFEE CASE WAS NOT GROUNDS FOR REVERSAL.

Mr. Christensen does not deny that his counsel intentionally and expressly referred
to the "McDonald's coffee case" in her closing argument. Nor does he deny that Lie beck
v. McDonald's has become the poster child of tort reform in this country (a case of
"national notoriety," as Mr. Christensen concedes). Nor does he dispute that counsel
incorrectly stated the nature of that case by telling the jury that the Liebeck verdict
resulted from a per diem compensatory damages argument, when it was actually an
award of punitive damages that had nothing to do with a per diem argument (and, in fact,
was later remitted). See M. McCann, et al, "Java Jive: Genealogy of a Juridical Icon,"
56 U. Miami L. Rev. 113, 127-130 (2001).
Mr. Christensen asks the Court to ignore such misconduct by claiming that it was
merely "non-prejudicial," "harmless" and "innocuous" "lawyer talk" used "to expose
Plaintiffs prejudicial per diem damages calculations." (Brief of Appellee, p. 19, 21,
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22;.)! Notably, Mr. Christensen does not claim that his counsel was responding to an
improper argument, only a "prejudicial" one. (Brief of Appellee, pp. 21-22.) (By design,
of course, every statement made in a closing argument is supposed to be prejudicial.
That is far different from improper.)
Mr. Christensen says that Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 11 Utah
2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960) is "particularly on-point," because the attorney in that case
made a per diem argument, and the Supreme Court said that such arguments are
"prejudicial." That is correct. The court also said that such arguments are permissible.
Presumably, that is why Mr. Christensen never objected to Mr. Boyle's counsel's closing
argument.
At best, then, Mr. Christensen's argument is that he was entitled to make an
improper argument in order to counter a proper argument. Not surprisingly, he cites no
authority for such a proposition.
In arguing that the statement was mere "lawyer talk," Mr. Christensen contends
that the statement did not prejudice Mr. Boyle. (Brief of Appellee, p. 19-20.) But the
Mr. Christensen does not identify the portion of counsel's closing argument to which he
is referring, but merely asks this Court to assume it was a per diem argument. Because it
is immaterial to resolution of the issue, Mr. Boyle will not delve into what does or does
not constitute a per diem argument.
Courts have held that an improper argument is not appropriate even in response to an
improper argument. "[A] court of law is no place to resort to the argument of 'he said it
first' or che did it too.' Opposing counsel's violations of professional standards should
never be the basis for engaging in professional misconduct. Merely because another
lawyer allegedly disregards the ethical rules does not give the opposing lawyer the right
to also disregard the rules. Further, asserting that engaging in misconduct because
another lawyer is also engaging in misconduct is in and of itself misconduct." Lioce v.
Cohen, 174 P.3d 970, 986 (Nev. 2008).
7

entire purpose of mentioning the Liebeck case is to appeal to a jury's prejudices. The
sole issue to be decided in this case was the amount of damages to which Mr. Boyle was
entitled, and the defendant's strategy was to depict Mr. Boyle as overreaching. It is not
coincidental that counsel picked the one case that uninformed jurors would most equate
with that sin. That is the very reason why defense lawyers cite it.
Mr. Christensen says that "[cjounsel obviously did not mean to offer the case as
evidence, or a substitute therefore, but simply as a statement offered to appeal to the
jury's common sense." (Brief of Appellee, p. 22.) Unfortunately, counsel did not simply
ask jurors to apply their common sense. She did not simply tell jurors that arguments like
that of plaintiffs counsel result in excessive verdicts.

Instead, she drew a direct

comparison between plaintiffs argument and another specific case, stating, "That's how
we get verdicts like the McDonald's case with a cup of coffee." Counsel essentially told
jurors that if they agreed with plaintiffs damages argument, they would be doing the
same thing the jury did in the infamous McDonald's case.
Moreover, even under Mr. Christensen's post hoc rationalization, Liebeck would
have no legitimate application to this case. As noted above, counsel's statement about
the Liebeck verdict was materially incorrect.

That verdict was for punitive, not

compensatory, damages, and did not result from a per diem argument, as counsel
(mis)represented. See Brief of Appellant, p. 22. There was no justification, factually or
legally, for counsel's assertion.
In arguing that a citation to the single most notorious damages verdict in the nation
should not be considered prejudicial, Mr. Christensen cites Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d
8

411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court determined that a
particular statement by defense counsel in closing argument regarding a traffic citation
was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. However, the trial court in that
case had sustained the plaintiffs objection to the comment, id. at 824, thus conveying to
the jury the impropriety of the remark.

In this case, the trial court overruled the

objection, suggesting to the jury that counsel's comparison to the McDonald's case was a
legitimate consideration.
Moreover, the prejudice in this case resulting from the Liebeck reference is
necessarily enhanced by the (lack of) voir dire on the very issue symbolized by that case.
Mr. Boyle was unable to ascertain, let alone challenge, persons whose preconceived
notions on tort reform made them especially susceptible to the "coffee case" argument.
The Court of Appeals determination that the trial court acted appropriately in refusing
tort reform voir dire and in overruling Mr. Boyle's objection to Mr. Christensen's
counsel's reference to the Liebeck case should be reversed.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF NORRINE BOYLE'S CLAIM FOR
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM.

The final issue on appeal, the dismissal of Norrine Boyle's claim for loss of
consortium, is reviewed de novo. Accordingly, both parties have cited to the record that
was before the trial court when the ruling was made. Mr. Christensen, however, has
failed to afford Mrs. Boyle the inferences to which she is entitled as a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment.
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For example, Mr. Christensen asks the Court to assume that this was a "very low
speed" accident. (Brief of Appellee, p. 7.) Although Mr. Christensen testified that he
struck Mr. Boyle at about ten miles per hour, (R. 354, p. 17), in a truck v. pedestrian
collision, that is not a "very low speed."
Mr. Christensen also implies that Mr. Boyle did not have symptoms on the day of
the accident. (See Brief of Appellee, p. 7.) However, the evidence was that, when Mr.
Christensen's vehicle struck Mr. Boyle, the tire of the defendant's truck pinned Mr.
Boyle's foot to the ground as Boyle rode up on the hood. All of the experts, including those
hired by Mr. Christensen, agreed that the impact was sufficient to cause a ruptured disc.
Initially, Mr. Boyle was relieved that the accident had not been more severe and that he was
able to walk away from it. He went back to his employment, but within a short time the
pain became so severe that he had to excuse himself and leave. The pains in his back
became severe on the date of the accident. (R. 328.)
A fact-by-fact response to Mr. Christensen's fact statement need not be delineated,
however, to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Norrine Boyle's
claim. Mr. Christensen does not contest that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find a
"dispute as to the causation and extent of Mr. Boyle's back injury." (Brief of Appellee, p.
23.)

It was also largely uncontested by Mr. Christensen that Mr. Boyle's injury is

permanent and life-altering. (E.g., R. 334, 342-345 (citing to testimony of plaintiff s expert
Dr. Lyle Mason).)
The existence of a fact issue on the first requirement of a loss of consortium claim (a
significant permanent injury that changes a person's lifestyle) was thus essentially
10

uncontested.

Mr. Christensen's principal argument is on the second requirement,

"incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the
injury[.r Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-11.
In a departure from his position before the Court of Appeals, where he argued that
this language must be interpreted to mean "completely" incapable, Mr. Christensen now
contends that incapability means Mr. Boyle "must be clearly unable to complete the
essential parts of his job after the injury." {Contrast Brief of Appellee, p. 25, with Brief of
Appellee at the Court of Appeals, p. 18.) Apparently, Mr. Christensen agrees with the
District of Utah's interpretation that the statute actually does not impose a literal
requirement of incapability.
Under Mr. Christensen's new interpretation of the statute, however, an injury could
relegate an individual to permanent part-time employment with the accompanying
ramifications (loss of benefits, impaired promotional opportunities, etc.), yet technically he
would not be incapable of performing the essential parts of his job after the injury, and
therefore no loss of consortium claim could obtain. That is not a reasonable interpretation.
State v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statute should be
given a reasonable and sensible construction and that the legislature did not intend an absurd
or unreasonable result.")
Contrary to Mr. Christensen's interpretation, Mr. Boyle believes that the statute
requires that an injury render a person "materially" incapable, i.e., that a material difference
in the injured party's ability to perform the types of jobs he performed before would satisfy
the statute. That would include an inability to work full-time any more, and/or an ability to
11

work only through significant pain, both of which were supported by evidence in the record.
See, e g., R. 261-262 (Mr. Boyle was no longer able to work 40 hours per week; at times is
unable to work even 30 hours; also describing continuous pain).
Moreover, an issue of fact existed as to whether the employment that Mr. Boyle was
able to get after the accident was substantially similar to the type of job he was previously
able to work.

Although Mr. Christensen argues that Mr. Boyle's prior and current

employment were basically the same, there was testimony from which a jury could have
found otherwise. See, e.g., R. 331-332 (former job included training functions, extensive
driving to private residences for sales presentations, and very high income potential; present
job is sedentary work at a call center). This was an issue of fact that should have been
submitted to the jury.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants / Plaintiffs respectfully request the
Court reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the trial court for a new trial on the
claims of John and Norrine Boyle.
DATED this 12th day of April, 2010.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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